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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Undergirding federal habeas law is an extensive 
procedural framework that limits when and how a petitioner 
may raise post-conviction claims for relief and which claims 
are reviewable in federal court.  Concerns of federalism, 
comity, and finality shape this complex framework and have 
required us to generate specific rules for when a petitioner’s 
claim may be adjudicated on the merits.  In this appeal brought 
by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from the District 
Court’s grant of habeas relief on petitioner’s first-degree 
murder conviction, we must interpret and apply a number of 
these rules to determine whether we have jurisdiction under 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3) over petitioner’s 
untimely cross-appeal from the District Court’s denial of 
habeas relief on his conspiracy conviction; if so, whether Rule 
4(a)(3)’s timeliness requirement should be waived in the 
interests of justice; and whether a certificate of appealability 
(COA) is required on cross-appeal.  In addition, on the 
Commonwealth’s appeal, we must consider whether the 
District Court was correct to conclude that petitioner’s due 
process claim and related ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim based on purportedly unconstitutional jury instructions 
were properly exhausted in state court, are meritorious, and 
withstand harmless error review.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will dismiss petitioner’s cross-appeal and, on the 
Commonwealth’s appeal, we will reverse the District Court’s 
grant of habeas relief. 
I.   Factual Background and Procedural History 
 Petitioner David Mathias was charged with, inter alia, 
first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree 
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murder based on a violent incident that left one person dead 
and another severely injured, though capable of testifying at 
Mathias’s state court trial.  As relevant to his defenses and the 
issues he would later raise on appeal, the record from that 2006 
trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas reflects that in 
the early hours of May 23, 2005, Mathias and future co-
defendant, Richard Jarmon, traveled to a boarding house where 
an acquaintance named Eric Richardson—later the victim-
witness at Mathias’s trial—rented a small efficiency room.   
According to Richardson’s trial testimony, Mathias 
knocked on Richardson’s door, while Jarmon entered an 
adjacent room where a friend of Richardson’s, Joseph Drew El, 
was lying on his stomach on the floor watching television.  
Richardson cautiously answered Mathias’s knock, and Mathias 
asked if he had change for a five-dollar bill.  Although he felt 
“disturbed” and thought this a peculiar request, Richardson 
retreated back into his room, closing the door behind him, and 
retrieved five singles.  App. 304.  Richardson then exited the 
room, taking care again to shut the door, and handed five one-
dollar bills to Mathias, who was waiting nearby with Jarmon 
and Drew El.  Mathias’s fictitious mission accomplished, he 
asked Jarmon, “Are you ready?” and Jarmon stood up as if to 
leave.  App. 304.   
Suddenly, Mathias drew a gun from his waistband and 
pointed it directly at Richardson’s stomach.  Richardson 
reacted quickly by grabbing Mathias’s wrist, but Mathias 
began to shoot at Richardson as the two struggled.  At the same 
moment, Jarmon drew a gun of his own and fired a fatal shot 
at Drew El, who still lay in a helpless and vulnerable position 
on the floor.  Jarmon then turned his gun on Richardson—
joining Mathias’s ongoing assault—while Richardson made a 
desperate attempt to flee the building, bleeding profusely from 
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gunshot wounds in his legs as he narrowly escaped.  
Richardson, “shot, scared, . . . frightened, [and] just running for 
[his] life,” App. 307, was fortunate to encounter police a few 
blocks away who rushed him to the trauma unit of a nearby 
hospital.  Back at the boarding house, Drew El died from the 
gunshot wounds inflicted by Jarmon.   
Mathias’s testimony at trial painted a different picture.  
He testified that he and Jarmon traveled to Richardson’s 
residence to buy marijuana, where, once that transaction was 
complete, Richardson and Jarmon exchanged heated words, 
drew their guns, and began shooting at one another.  Mathias 
portrayed himself as an innocent bystander and claimed that he 
was unaware Drew El was injured in the crossfire.   
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial judge instructed 
the jury, among other things, on the charges of first-degree 
murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and on 
accomplice liability.  In the course of these instructions, 
however, the judge made inconsistent statements about the 
specific intent requirement for accomplice liability, at some 
points properly instructing the jurors they must find the 
accomplice himself had the specific intent to kill, and at other 
points, over defense counsel’s objection and contrary to 
Pennsylvania law, indicating that the jurors could convict an 
accomplice based on the specific intent of the principal.   
Specifically, before giving the “formal charge,” the trial 
judge offered “plain English” commentary intended to give a 
“common sense view” of the relevant theories of liability and 
the crimes charged.  App. 610.  During this portion of the 
instructions, the judge spoke accurately and at length about 
accomplice liability.  For example, the judge explained that “a 
defendant is an accomplice of another for a particular crime if 
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. . . [it is] proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [t]hat the 
defendant had the intent of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of that crime.”  App. 611.  Applying this rule to 
the instant case, the judge further explained that the jury would 
have to “find beyond a reasonable doubt that there ha[d] been 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shared that 
specific intent to kill Joseph Drew El.”  App. 614.   
Next, transitioning to the “formal instruction,” App. 
621, the trial judge covered first-, second-, and third-degree 
murder, conspiracy, aggravated assault, and weapons 
violations.1  During this portion of the colloquy, the judge 
erroneously indicated no less than six times that Mathias could 
be convicted of first-degree murder through accomplice 
liability if the jury found Jarmon possessed the specific intent 
to kill Drew El.  These instructions were misleadingly stated in 
the disjunctive, with the judge announcing the jury was 
required to find that either Mathias “or his alleged accomplice, 
Richard Jarmon, had the specific intent to kill . . . ”  App. 615.   
Finally, addressing the charge of conspiracy to commit 
first-degree murder, the trial judge declined to “repeat” the 
definition of first-degree murder, noting that it was “the exact 
same requirement” and that it comprised the “same elements” 
that had been introduced earlier in the colloquy, but explaining 
that first-degree murder was the “object of the conspiracy.”  
App. 628.  From there, the judge correctly laid out the elements 
of conspiracy, explaining that the alleged co-conspirators must 
                                              
1 The jury instructions also covered robbery, for which 
Mathias was not charged.  However, because the prosecution’s 
theory of the case was that Mathias and Jarmon intended to rob 
Richardson, the elements of robbery were relevant to the 
instruction on second-degree murder.   
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have “shared the intent to commit the crime of first degree 
murder,” which “would include the defendant having . . . 
shared the specific intent to kill.”  App. 630.   
After these instructions, the jury deliberated for 
approximately one day before returning a verdict of guilty on 
the charges of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy to 
commit first-degree murder, aggravated assault, possession of 
an instrument of crime, and carrying a firearm without a 
license.  Mathias was sentenced to a term of life on the murder 
conviction and a consecutive term of fifteen-and-a-half to 
thirty-one years on the conspiracy conviction, to be served 
concurrent with lesser terms for the additional charges.   
Mathias appealed his convictions to the Superior Court.  
While appellate counsel raised the claim that the jury 
instructions on criminal conspiracy were erroneous and 
violated due process because they “forced the jury to convict 
on first degree murder if they believed that there was an overt 
or implied agreement,” Supp. App. 2, he did not raise any 
arguments regarding the first-degree murder instructions.  The 
Superior Court observed that appellate counsel had not 
adequately briefed any of Mathias’s claims and so deemed 
them waived.  Nonetheless, it opted to address the conspiracy 
instruction claim on the merits, finding it “somewhat difficult 
to follow” counsel’s argument but concluding that “the trial 
court clearly instructed the jury that in order to convict 
Appellant of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, it must 
find that [he] had the specific intent to kill.”  App. 678, 680-
81.   
Unsuccessful on direct appeal, Mathias filed a pro se 
petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”).  Supp. App. 45.  In an untimely filing attempting to 
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amend his petition, Mathias raised a Sixth Amendment claim 
for ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that 
appellate counsel failed to challenge the constitutionality of the 
first-degree murder instruction.  Although the Court of 
Common Pleas dismissed Mathias’s late filing, the Superior 
Court rejected it on the merits, applying Pennsylvania’s 
formulation of the two-part ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
test laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
Specifically, it held that counsel’s performance was not 
deficient because although “the specific intent instructions and 
instruction on first degree murder . . . [were] less than precise,” 
App. 664, and “lacked clarity,” App. 665, “the [trial] court did 
instruct the jury . . . that it was required to find that Appellant 
had specific intent to kill,” App. 665, and that Mathias was not 
prejudiced because “the jury did find that Appellant had a 
specific intent to kill Mr. El since it found him guilty of 
conspiracy to commit first degree murder, which requires a 
finding of specific intent to kill.”  App. 666.   
Turning next to the federal courts, Mathias filed a pro 
se habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he 
claimed (1) the first-degree murder instruction violated his due 
process rights, and (2) appellate counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing generally to file an adequate brief and 
thereby waiving whatever claims he might have raised on 
appeal.  The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the first 
claim either on the ground that it was unexhausted and 
procedurally defaulted or, alternatively, that the alleged 
constitutional error in the first-degree murder instruction was 
harmless in light of the specific intent finding the jury must 
have made in convicting Mathias for conspiracy to commit 
first-degree murder, and rejecting the second claim because 
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Mathias was unable to show how he was prejudiced by 
appellate counsel’s deficient performance.   
The District Court, however, rejected the Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendation and concluded that Mathias did not 
fail to exhaust the first-degree murder instruction claim 
because, although he did not label it as a separate claim in his 
PCRA petition, the Superior Court, in adjudicating the 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that he did expressly 
raise, also considered the constitutionality of the instruction 
itself in evaluating deficient performance and prejudice.  In 
another threshold decision, the District Court found the 
Superior Court’s application of federal law on internally 
inconsistent jury instructions was contrary to that prescribed 
by the Supreme Court in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 
(1985), and therefore proceeded to review this claim de novo 
instead of using the highly deferential standard of review 
typically required when federal courts review state court 
decisions on habeas.  See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 
100 (2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)); Panetti v. 
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-54 (2007). 
As to the merits of the jury instruction claim, the District 
Court, relying largely on Francis, held that, read as a whole, 
the instructions relieved “the Commonwealth of its burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the key element that 
Mathias had a specific intent to kill,” Mathias v. Collins, No. 
13-2002, 2014 WL 5780834, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2014) 
(citing Francis, 471 U.S. at 322; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364 (1970)), and thus that the Superior Court’s contrary 
decision was unconstitutional and warranted habeas relief.  The 
District Court also rejected the Magistrate Judge’s harmless 
error determination, reasoning instead that the conspiracy 
charge, by virtue of incorporating the first-degree murder 
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charge, made it impossible to infer a jury finding of specific 
intent and that the jury instruction regarding the jury’s manner 
of deliberating had the same effect.   
With respect to Mathias’s second claim—based on 
appellate counsel’s generally inadequate briefing—the District 
Court construed it liberally as a claim that counsel was 
ineffective specifically for failing to raise these concerns with 
the first-degree murder instruction, a claim which Mathias had 
expressly raised and exhausted on PCRA review.  The District 
Court again applied plenary review, assuming the Superior 
Court’s application of Pennsylvania law was contrary to that 
prescribed by the Supreme Court in Strickland, which Mathias 
now concedes was error.  And, having determined that the due 
process claim related to the first-degree murder instruction 
itself had merit, the District Court concluded that appellate 
counsel necessarily was deficient for failing to raise that claim 
and that Mathias was prejudiced by that deficient performance. 
Accordingly, the District Court granted Mathias habeas relief 
on the basis of his ineffective assistance claim, as well as his 
due process claim.   
The Commonwealth now appeals those rulings, and 
Mathias, in an untimely filing over which our jurisdiction is 
uncertain, cross-appeals, seeking a grant of habeas relief on his 
conviction for criminal conspiracy to commit first-degree 
murder and requesting a COA to assert both Sixth Amendment 
and due process claims based on the jury charge underlying 
that conviction.  For the reasons that follow, we will exercise 
jurisdiction over Mathias’s untimely cross-appeal, waiving the 
Rule 4(a)(3) timeliness requirement but denying Mathias’s 
application for a COA, and we will reverse the District Court’s 
grant of habeas relief on Mathias’s murder conviction. 
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II. Mathias’s Cross-Appeal  
 The claims Mathias seeks to raise on cross-appeal—
regarding the constitutionality of the trial court’s conspiracy 
instructions and appellate counsel’s failure to effectively brief 
this issue—are only eligible for review on the merits if they 
can clear three procedural hurdles.  The first is jurisdictional: 
As Mathias concedes that his notice of cross-appeal was 
untimely filed under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(3), Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3), we must determine if that rule 
is mandatory and binding on the court or permissive and 
excusable by the reviewing court.  The second is the standard 
for excusing a default and our application of that standard to 
this case.  And the third is whether the statutory COA 
requirement that applies to a petitioner’s appeal on a successive 
petition also extends to a petitioner’s cross-appeal, and if so, 
whether we should grant one in Mathias’s case.  We conclude 
Mathias reaches but falters at this last threshold.    
A.  Jurisdiction Over Mathias’s Cross-Appeal 
Under Rule 4(a)(3) 
We first must determine if Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(3) is jurisdictional, a question that has divided 
the Courts of Appeals.2  The crux of the issue is that, in contrast 
                                              
2 Compare, e.g., Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food 
& Drug Ctrs., Inc., 476 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 
Rule 4(a)(3) nonjurisdictional ); Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 
F.3d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); Spann v. Colonial Vill., 
Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same), with, e.g., 
Jackson v. Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232, 1239 n.6 (11th Cir.) 
(finding Rule 4(a)(3) jurisdictional), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
155 (2015); Art Midwest Inc. v. Atl. Ltd. P’ship XII, 742 F.3d 
12 
 
to the thirty-day time limit for filing an initial notice of appeal, 
which appears in 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and has been recognized by 
the Supreme Court as a jurisdictional bar, Bowles v. Russell, 
551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007), Rule 4(a)(3) is not a creature of 
statute, but a court-promulgated rule.  Today we join those 
Circuits that have found this distinction of jurisdictional 
significance.  As explained below, we are guided to this 
outcome by our own precedent and by recent Supreme Court 
case law. 
We begin with our case law, which paves the way for 
our holding today though not by the straightest of routes.  Our 
starting point is United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 943 
F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1991), where we observed that “[a]lthough a 
timely, initial notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, 
it has been the rule of this Circuit that Rule 4(a)(3), which 
provides . . . time for filing cross or other separate appeals, is 
not a jurisdictional prerequisite,” id. at 342-43.  We 
acknowledged in Tabor that the Supreme Court, in Torres v. 
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988), deemed 
jurisdictional Rule 3(c)’s requirement that a notice of cross-
appeal name all parties, and that Torres made reference to the 
“jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and 4.”  Id. at 317.  But 
because Torres offered no “definitive statement as to whether 
or not a cross-appeal is mandatory or jurisdictional,” Tabor, 
943 F.2d at 344, we reasoned that it did not disturb our 
treatment of Rule 4(a)(3) as permissive.  Two years later, 
however, in EF Operating Corp. v. American Buildings, 993 
                                              
206, 213 (5th Cir. 2014) (same); Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 
511 F.3d 16, 33 n.7 (1st Cir. 2007) (same).  See generally 
Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1298 
& nn. 27, 28 (9th Cir. 1999) (listing cases).   
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F.2d 1046 (1993), we changed course and, without citing to or 
distinguishing Tabor, held in view of Torres that Rules 3 and 
4 are in fact jurisdictional, id. at 1049 n.1.  
While we have recognized the tension between Tabor 
and EF Operating since that time, we have not had occasion to 
resolve it.  See, e.g., Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
346 F.3d 402, 411-12 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Erwin, 
765 F.3d 219, 232 n.9 (3d Cir. 2014).  We reach that crossroad 
today, and, as our case law teaches that where two precedential 
opinions are in “unavoidable conflict,” the earlier opinion 
controls, Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 194 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2009), we deem Tabor, which treated Rule 4(a)(3) as 
nonjurisdictional, to be the law of our Circuit, see Reilly v. City 
of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining 
that “en banc consideration is required” in order to overrule the 
holding of a prior precedential opinion). 
The rule of Tabor also accords with recent Supreme 
Court cases that distinguish “claim-processing rules”—that is, 
“rules that seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by 
requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain 
specified times,” such as “[f]iling deadlines”—as 
nonjurisdictional unless Congress has made them jurisdictional 
through clear and unequivocal statutory language.  Henderson 
v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435-36 (2011); see Gonzalez v. 
Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141-42 (2012); Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214-
15; Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005); Kontrick 
v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 453-54 (2004).  Examples of claim-
processing rules that the Court has specified are 
nonjurisdictional include time limits in bankruptcy 
proceedings for a creditor to file objections to a debtor’s 
discharge, Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 453-54, and the time period in 
criminal prosecutions for filing post-trial motions, Eberhart, 
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546 U.S. at 15-16.  By contrast, the Court has classified the 
thirty-day time period for filing a notice of appeal as 
jurisdictional, noting “the jurisdictional distinction between 
court-promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress,” 
Bowles, 551 U.S. at 211-12, and explaining that “Rule 4 of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure carries § 2107 into 
practice,” Bowles, 551 U.S. at 208, in contrast to mere 
“procedural rules adopted by the [c]ourt for the orderly 
transaction of its business,” id. at 211 (quoting Kontrick, 540 
U.S. at 454).   
These cases indicate that, in contrast to Rule 4(a)(1), 
which requires appellants to take the “mandatory and 
jurisdictional” step of initiating a timely appeal, Bowles, 551 
U.S. at 209, Rule 4(a)(3) is properly considered a 
nonjurisdictional “claim-processing rule”—promulgated to set 
filing deadlines for appellees considering whether to cross-
appeal when a case is already brought within our jurisdiction, 
Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435.  That is because, although Rule 
4(a)(3) provides for cross-appeals the analogue to Rule 
4(a)(1)’s time limit for initial appeals, it is not derived from 
any statutory analogue to 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a), but instead is 
simply a “procedural rule[] adopted by the [c]ourt for the 
orderly transaction of its business,” Bowles, 551 U.S. at 211 
(quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454), like other 
nonjurisdictional, claim-processing rules “that seek to promote 
the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties 
take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,” 
Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435.  To designate that type of rule as 
jurisdictional would too “lightly attach . . . drastic 
consequences” to a procedural requirement never intended to 
“govern [our] . . . adjudicatory authority.”  Gonzalez, 565 U.S. 
at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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In sum, we conclude Rule 4(a)(3) is not jurisdictional so 
that a party’s failure to comply with it may be excused by the 
reviewing court.  We turn next to the standard for granting that 
relief and whether that standard has been met in this case.   
 B. Waiver of Timeliness Requirement 
In expounding on the standard for excusing a Rule 
4(a)(3) violation, we start with Tabor, where we stated that the 
requirement may be waived “in the interest of justice under 
appropriate circumstances,” Tabor, 943 F.2d at 343, but we did 
not elaborate on that standard.  Because we must do so today, 
we will review our own case law, the standards articulated by 
other Courts of Appeals, and an analogous standard for the 
setting aside of default judgments and draw on their teachings 
before defining the standard for our Court.   
As far as our case law, in Rhoads v. Ford Motor Co., 
514 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1975), we waived the deadline for a 
third-party defendant on the ground that he “might well have 
believed that he could not appeal the final judgment,” id. at 
934.  Next, in Tabor itself, we excused a party’s untimely 
motion of cross-appeal, observing that, under the facts of that 
case, “the disposition as to one party [was] inextricably 
intertwined with the interests of a non-appealing party so as to 
make it impossible to grant relief to one party without granting 
relief to the other.”  Tabor, 943 F.2d at 344.  Finally, in Repola 
v. Morbark Industries, Inc., 980 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1992), we 
declined to waive the strictures of Rule 4(a)(3), observing that 
the claims excluded as a result of our decision were not 
“inextricably intertwined” with the claims before us and “relief 
could [still] be fairly granted” in the case, id. at 942.   
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Outside of our own jurisprudence, in S.M. v. J.K., 262 
F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit, declining to waive 
the timely filing requirement, considered whether the delay 
was understandable, the obviousness of the need to file a cross-
appeal, and whether the matters were inextricably related, id. 
at 923.  That court determined there was “no reason to allow” 
the delayed cross-appeal where the putative claims were 
“essentially unrelated to the issues” on appeal, and the appellee 
“knew within the time period for filing her notice . . . that she 
intended to appeal the court’s punitive damages ruling.”  Id.  
And in Hysell v. Iowa Public Service Company, 559 F.2d 468 
(8th Cir. 1977), the Eighth Circuit vacated a judgment entered 
against a party not actually before it, notwithstanding that the 
deadline for filing a notice of cross-appeal had already passed, 
explaining, “To allow the judgment against the City to stand 
would be to risk assessing varying liabilities against two parties 
to the same wrong.”  Id. at 476-77. 
We also find instructive the standard for setting aside a 
default judgment.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
provides for relief from the entry of a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding pursuant to enumerated circumstances which 
include, under Rule 60(b)(1), “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect” and, under Rule 60(b)(6), “any other 
reason that justifies relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  We have 
held that the relevant factors to be considered on a Rule 
60(b)(1) motion include prejudice, meritorious defense, 
culpability, and “the effectiveness of alternative sanctions,” 
Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1987), 
and that a party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show 
“exceptional circumstances,” to wit: that “absent such relief an 
extreme and unexpected hardship will result,”  Mayberry v. 
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Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1977) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
What we distill from these sources is that the factors 
informing when waiver of Rule 4(a)(3) is appropriate “in the 
interest of justice,” Tabor, 943 F.2d at 343, include: prejudice, 
merits, willfulness, and extraordinary circumstance.  That is, 
we ask whether any party will be adversely and unfairly 
affected if the cross-appeal is not allowed; whether the issues 
substantially overlap such that severance may be inefficient or 
create an absurd result; whether good reason exists for the 
delay in filing; and whether there are extenuating 
circumstances present in the case that otherwise warrant relief.  
These considerations, taken as a group, encapsulate the issues 
courts find most significant when deciding whether to waive 
Rule 4(a)(3), and, applied with diligence, will maintain a high 
standard that safeguards the orderly and efficient 
administration of justice while keeping a level focus on 
fairness.   
Applying these factors, we conclude without difficulty 
that waiver is appropriate here.  The two new claims Mathias 
seeks to raise on cross-appeal would not likely support a 
second or successive habeas petition, which, if attempted, 
would have to overcome the onerous successive-petition bar, 
see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), and there is no reason to believe 
the Government would suffer any prejudice by opposing his 
claims while litigating its own appeal.  Further, although 
Mathias’s putative cross-claims pertain to the trial court’s 
conspiracy instructions rather than its first-degree murder 
instructions, they are substantively related to the claims already 
before us and would require similar legal analyses on the 
merits.  See Repola, 980 F.2d at 941.  Finally, while proceeding 
pro se, Mathias may well have believed he could not raise 
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additional claims through a cross-appeal mechanism, see 
Rhoads, 514 F.2d at 934, and, demonstrating diligence on 
Mathias’s behalf, his newly appointed counsel filed the notice 
of cross-appeal promptly after entering an appearance in the 
case.  Considering these factors (and without need to consider 
extraordinary circumstances), the interests of justice are served 
by the efficiency and fairness in allowing Mathias’s cross-
appeal to proceed.  Accordingly, we will excuse his untimely 
cross-appeal and consider the next threshold he must cross: the 
COA requirement.    
C. Certificate of Appealability 
The Supreme Court stated as recently as 2015 that 
whether a petitioner is required to obtain a COA when taking 
a cross-appeal is “unclear,” observing that 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), 
which establishes the COA requirement on appeal, “performs 
an important gate-keeping function” that no longer exists once 
an appeal is noticed.  Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793, 802 
(2015).  The Court expressly declined to decide whether 
§ 2253(c) “embraces a cross-appeal,” id., and our Circuit has 
similarly left the matter for another day, see Mickens-Thomas 
v. Vaughn, 321 F.3d 374, 376 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003).  That day has 
arrived, and we hold that a COA is mandatory for a petitioner 
seeking to take a cross-appeal.     
When initiating an appeal, a petitioner is obligated to 
obtain a COA by making “a substantial showing of the denial 
of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)—which 
includes a “showing that reasonable jurists could debate 
whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a 
different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to 
deserve encouragement to proceed further.”’  Slack v. 
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. 
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Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).  We perceive no reason 
to set aside this obligation merely because the petitioner’s 
claims happen to arrive by way of cross-appeal.  To the 
contrary, in this context too it can serve its intended purpose of 
“screen[ing] out issues unworthy of judicial time and attention 
and ensur[ing] that frivolous claims are not assigned to merits 
panels,” a “gatekeeping function” that is satisfied “[o]nce a 
judge has made the determination that a COA is warranted and 
resources are deployed in briefing and argument.”3  Gonzalez, 
565 U.S. at 145.   
This is a case in point, where two putative cross-claims, 
albeit accompanied by novel questions of procedural viability, 
have added significantly to the parties’ briefing and 
preparation for argument, affecting our Court in equal 
measure.  In short, Mathias must obtain a COA before his 
cross-claims can be addressed on the merits, and we now take 
up his application.   
To merit a COA, Mathias must meet the “substantial 
showing” requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).  See 
Slack, 529 U.S. at 483.  In addition, where a district court has 
denied a petition on procedural grounds “a COA should issue 
when the [petitioner] shows, at least, that jurists of reason 
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim 
of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason 
                                              
3 Although the Seventh Circuit has suggested that once a 
state has elected to appeal the grant of habeas relief, “there are 
no remaining gates to be guarded,” and thus, it is futile to 
require a COA on cross-appeal, Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 
398 (7th Cir. 2002), we do not interpret § 2253(c)’s 
“gatekeeping function” so narrowly, Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 
145.   
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would find it debatable whether the district court was correct 
in its procedural ruling.”  Id. at 484.  Quite simply, Mathias 
cannot overcome this procedural hurdle.   
As Mathias puts it, he “seeks to cross-appeal the district 
court’s denial of relief” on his claims that the conspiracy 
instruction violated his due process rights and that appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge that instruction.  
App. 58.  The District Court, however, made clear that Mathias 
“waived any challenge to the conspiracy conviction and 
instructions,” Mathias, 2014 WL 5780834, at *9 n.5, and that 
conclusion is supported by the record, which nowhere reflects 
that Mathias raised these claims in his § 2254 petition.   
Mathias, while conceding he did not articulate the 
claims in explicit terms, nonetheless contends they were 
implicit in the claims he did raise, suggesting the District Court 
should have recognized them from offhand references to the 
conspiracy instruction made in the parties’ briefing, the fact of 
that instruction’s incorporation of the first-degree murder 
instruction, and the argument raised by counsel on direct 
appeal that the conspiracy instruction was unconstitutional.  
We reject the notion that the mere recitation of facts or 
procedural history or some combination of hints and innuendo 
suffice to fairly raise a claim.  Rather, “the crucial question 
regarding waiver is whether the petitioner presented the 
argument with sufficient specificity to alert the district court,” 
that is, whether the district court was put on “notice of the legal 
argument.”  Lark v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 596, 
607-08 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 
256 (3d Cir. 2005)).  And that standard is not met merely 
because the facts underlying a potential legal argument were 
available in the record.  Mathias failed to alert the District 
Court to the legal claims themselves, see id., so that we cannot 
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say “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 
District Court was correct in its procedural ruling” that those 
claims were waived, Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.  For that reason, 
we will deny Mathias’s application for a COA and dismiss his 
cross-appeal.   
III. Commonwealth’s Appeal  
The Commonwealth appeals the District Court’s grant 
of the Great Writ on Mathias’s conviction for first-degree 
murder based on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and due 
process claims arising from the first-degree murder instruction.  
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the 
Commonwealth that the District Court incorrectly applied a de 
novo standard of review in considering the ineffective 
assistance claim and that, when reviewed with proper 
deference, the Superior Court’s decision was not contrary to or 
an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984).  We also reach this conclusion as to the due 
process claim, applying appropriate deference and holding that 
that claim was exhausted and the Superior Court had the 
opportunity to, and in fact did, address the merits, rendering a 
decision that was not contrary to or an unreasonable 
application of federal law governing internally inconsistent 
jury instructions, and nonetheless any error arising from the 
instructions would have been harmless. 
 A.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.  
Because the District Court did not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing and engaged in no independent fact finding, we apply 
de novo review to its factual inferences drawn from the state 
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court record and its legal conclusions, including the grant of 
habeas relief.  Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 
2007); Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 758 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 B. First-Degree Murder Instruction Claims  
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Mathias, to prevail on his habeas 
petition, carried the burden of demonstrating that the Superior 
Court decision was “‘contrary to’ federal law then clearly 
established in the holdings of [the Supreme] Court” or 
‘“involved an unreasonable application of’ such law.”  Richter, 
562 U.S. at 100 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)); see Cullen 
v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).  “A state court 
decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law if it 
‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth’ in 
Supreme Court precedent, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that 
are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 
from that reached by the Supreme Court.’”  Eley v. Erickson, 
712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 362, 405, 406 (2000)) (alteration in original).   
In contrast, a state court decision reflects an 
“unreasonable application of such law” only “where there is no 
possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state 
court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court’s 
precedents,” a standard the Supreme Court has advised is 
“difficult to meet” because it was “meant to be.”  Richter, 562 
U.S. at 102.  As the Supreme Court has cautioned, an 
“unreasonable application of federal law is different from an 
incorrect application of federal law,” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410), and whether we 
“conclude[] in [our] independent judgment that the relevant 
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state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 
erroneously or incorrectly” is irrelevant, as AEDPA sets a 
higher bar.  Williams, 529 U.S. at 411.   
Here, as to both Mathias’s ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel and due process claims based on the first-degree 
murder instruction, the District Court held the Superior Court’s 
decision was “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 
precedent and thus applied de novo review instead of AEDPA 
deference, concluding the claims were meritorious.  These 
rulings were in error.  As we explain below, (1) the Superior 
Court’s decision was not contrary to Strickland so that the 
District Court should have applied AEDPA deference, 
determining whether the Superior Court’s application of 
Strickland was an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Supreme Court precedent; (2) the Superior Court’s 
decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland 
because, regardless of whether counsel’s performance was 
deficient, the Superior Court did not clearly err in determining 
there was no prejudice; and (3) the Superior Court’s decision 
was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 
precedent on internally inconsistent jury instructions, and 
regardless any error was harmless.  We address these issues in 
turn.   
 1. AEDPA Deference 
The District Court here declined to apply AEDPA 
deference in reviewing the Superior Court’s ineffective 
assistance and due process analysis, holding both were 
“contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent.”  
Mathias, 2014 WL 5780834, at *8; see id. at *5.  It did so in 
error because, as for the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim, it determined the Superior Court, by relying on the 
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Pennsylvania formulation of Strickland, “did not delve into 
the[] questions” of deficient performance and prejudice that 
Strickland requires and therefore was “contrary to Strickland.”  
Id. at *5.  The state law formulation on which the Superior 
Court relied, however, is one we already have expressly held 
is “not contrary to Strickland,” Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 
106 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005), and the Superior Court not only invoked 
that permissible test, but proceeded to apply it, making findings 
as to both deficient performance and actual prejudice.  Hence, 
as even Mathias concedes on appeal, the District Court simply 
erred in viewing the Superior Court’s decision as “contrary to” 
clearly established federal law, Richter, 562 U.S. at 100, and 
the proper inquiry is whether the Superior Court’s rejection of 
Mathias’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, 
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121-23 (2009); Collins 
v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 546-50 (3d Cir. 
2014).  The District Court misapplied plenary review to 
Mathias’s due process claim as well, failing to cite or consider 
in its analysis a key Supreme Court case under which the 
Superior Court’s decision is not “contrary to” clearly 
established federal law.  Richter, 562 U.S. at 100.  Applying 
the appropriate deferential standard of review, we turn first to 
the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
 2. Ineffective Assistance Claim 
On habeas review, we may begin and, when dispositive, 
end with either of Strickland’s two prongs, see Burt v. Titlow, 
134 S. Ct. 10, 18 n.3 (2013); Collins, 742 F.3d at 547, and here 
we follow “the practical suggestion in Strickland that we . . . 
consider the prejudice prong before examining the 
performance of counsel prong” because that approach is “less 
burdensome to defense counsel,” United States v. Lilly, 536 
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F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008) (alteration omitted) (citation 
omitted), and makes it “easier to dispose of [the] 
ineffectiveness claim,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Vickers v. 
Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 850 n.10 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  Applying appropriate AEDPA deference,4 we must 
assess whether, even assuming counsel’s performance was 
deficient, the Superior Court’s decision that Mathias did not 
suffer prejudice was “‘contrary to’ federal law then clearly 
established in the holdings of [the Supreme] Court” or 
‘“involved an unreasonable application of’ such law,” Richter, 
562 U.S. at 100 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1))—an 
assessment that requires us to examine whether the petitioner 
has shown “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different,” with “a reasonable probability” 
meaning “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Because the 
Strickland standard is an especially “general” one, “a state 
court has even more latitude to reasonably determine” whether 
                                              
4 While the Supreme Court has stated that “doubly 
deferential judicial review . . . applies to a Strickland claim 
evaluated under [AEDPA],” Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123, and at 
least suggested in dictum that such deference applies to 
Strickland’s prejudice prong, see Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202, the 
Courts of Appeals have taken different approaches to this 
issue, see Waiters v. Lee, 857 F.3d 466, 477 n.20 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(collecting cases), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 18, 2017) (No. 
17-5662).  As it was not specifically briefed by the parties in 
this case, and reversal here is warranted under traditional 
AEDPA deference in any event, we will leave for another day 
whether “double deference” applies to both of Strickland’s 
prongs. 
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a petitioner has satisfied it.  Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123 (“The 
more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching 
outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” (quoting 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004))); see id. at 
122.   
Here, Mathias argues he was prejudiced by appellate 
counsel’s deficient performance because, had counsel argued 
that the inconsistent jury charge allowed him to be convicted 
of first-degree murder without a finding of specific intent, he 
would have received a new trial.  Mathias bases this argument 
on Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), where the 
Supreme Court observed that if two discrete jury instructions 
regarding a requisite element are presented in contradictory 
terms, there exists “a reasonable likelihood that a juror 
understood the instructions in an unconstitutional manner, 
unless other language in the charge explains the infirm 
language sufficiently to eliminate this possibility,” id. at 322 
n.8.  The Superior Court’s failure to heed that admonition, 
according to Mathias (and the District Court),5 was an 
                                              
5 Based on Francis, the District Court granted habeas 
relief to Mathias because the trial court gave contradictory 
instructions—directing on the one hand, that the jury would 
have to “find beyond a reasonable doubt that there ha[d] been 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shared 
th[e] specific intent to kill Joseph Drew El,” App. 614, and that 
“a defendant is an accomplice of another for a particular crime 
if . . . [it is] proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [t]hat the 
defendant had the intent of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of that crime,” App. 611, and stating on the other, 
on at least six occasions that the jury was required to find that 
either Mathias “or” his alleged accomplice, Richard Jarmon, 
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unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court 
case law.   
That is not so, for neither Mathias nor the District Court 
considered the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in 
Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004) (per curiam), which 
calls the holding of Francis into question and, at a minimum, 
demonstrates that it was not then “clearly established.”  In 
Middleton, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of 
habeas relief where the trial court had given “three correct 
instructions and one contrary one” regarding imperfect self-
defense without providing any correction or explanation for the 
discrepancy.  Id. at 438.  Relying on the familiar test that asks 
whether there is a “reasonable likelihood that the jury has 
applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the 
Constitution,” id. at 437 (citing Estelle v. Mcguire, 502 U.S. 
62, 72 (1991)), but omitting any citation or reference to 
Francis, the Court explained that the Ninth Circuit “failed to 
give appropriate deference to the state court’s decision” where 
the state court applied the proper test and merely reached a 
different conclusion regarding the “likelihood the jury was 
misled,” id. at 437-38.  The Court expressly characterized the 
instructions as “ambiguous because they were internally 
inconsistent,” id. at 438, a descriptor that could easily apply to 
both Francis and the instant case.   
Middleton’s divergence from Francis is striking and, 
here, outcome determinative because it renders the relevant 
Supreme Court precedent on ambiguous jury instructions less 
than “clearly established.”  Middleton and Francis are both 
cited and applied as good law for the propositions we discuss 
                                              
had the specific intent to kill Joseph Drew El. App. 615-16, 
622-23.   
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today, and it appears no court has had occasion to resolve the 
tension between them.  See, e.g., Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 
U.S. 179, 191-92, (2009) (citing Middleton); Bey v. 
Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 240 n.47 (3d Cir. 
2017) (citing Francis); Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper, 785 F.3d 
1059, 1078 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Middleton); Johnson v. 
McKune, 288 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing 
Francis); United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 733-35 
(3d Cir. 1999) (same).  Nor need we today, because the 
significance of Middleton to our decision is that it calls into 
question when and under what circumstances the curative jury 
instruction mandated by Francis is required and “fairminded 
jurists could disagree” and reasonably reach different results 
under these two cases.  Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.   
Here, in conducting its analysis of Mathias’s 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the Superior Court 
found conclusive the accurate portions of the trial court’s first-
degree murder instruction—where it properly articulated the 
specific intent requirement—as well as the conspiracy 
instruction, which was consistently correct and served as the 
basis for the jury’s conviction on that charge.  Although the 
Superior Court acknowledged trial counsel’s multiple 
objections to the first-degree murder instructions, and that the 
instructions were “less than precise,” App. 664, it concluded 
Mathias could not establish prejudice because the due process 
claim appellate counsel might have raised was unlikely to 
succeed given the Superior Court’s assessment of the jury 
instructions in their entirety.   
Applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, we 
conclude the Superior Court’s application of Strickland was 
not an unreasonable one.  Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123.  By 
reviewing the jury charge as a whole and accounting for the 
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unique facts of Mathias’s case, the Superior Court, as a 
threshold matter, properly applied the Supreme Court’s 
“reasonable likelihood” test for determining an incorrect 
instruction’s constitutional effect, see Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, 
and, in light of the tension between Francis and Middleton and 
the implications of that tension for the jury instructions in 
Mathias’s case, we cannot say the Superior Court’s prejudice 
analysis reflected an unreasonable application of “clearly 
established” federal law, see Richter, 562 U.S. at 101; Jacobs, 
395 F.3d at 106.  
In sum, because the Superior Court’s decision passes 
muster when reviewed with proper deference under AEDPA, 
the District Court erred in granting Mathias habeas relief on 
this claim.    
3. Due Process Claim 
With respect to Mathias’s due process claim based on 
the first-degree murder instruction, as a threshold matter, the 
Commonwealth challenges the District Court’s conclusions 
that it was exhausted, had merit, and was not harmless.  As 
explained below, we agree with the District Court only as to 
exhaustion because we conclude the Superior Court’s rejection 
of the due process claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law, and that any 
error was harmless, in any event.  We will reverse the District 
Court’s grant of habeas on this claim.   
Federal courts may not grant relief unless a petitioner 
has “exhausted the remedies available” in the state courts.  28 
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).  To satisfy this requirement, a 
petitioner must “fairly present” his federal claim’s “factual and 
legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them 
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on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.”  Robinson v. 
Beard, 762 F.3d 316, 328 (3d Cir. 2014); see Baldwin v. Reese, 
541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).  Here, although his pro se brief 
mentioned only a claim of ineffective assistance in the headers 
to this argument, Mathias expressly argued in the text of his 
brief before the Superior Court that the first-degree murder 
instruction itself violated the Due Process Clause and cited to 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and to relevant United States Supreme Court cases, including 
Francis, to support that argument.  Under these circumstances, 
and recognizing, as we must, that pro se petitions are to be 
construed liberally, Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 198 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838, 845 (Pa. 
2002), we are satisfied that Mathias did fairly present his due 
process claim to the Superior Court and that the Superior Court 
rejected that claim on the merits—albeit within its discussion 
of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and based on 
state cases that incorporated the federal standard,6  See Picard 
                                              
6 To be clear, we do not hold today that, simply because 
a petitioner brings a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
or a state court adjudicates that claim, every claim counsel is 
allegedly deficient for failing to raise necessarily has been 
fairly presented to the state court as a federal claim.  Indeed, 
that would effect a novel, gaping, and unwarranted expansion 
of federal habeas review, particularly as petitioners may 
discuss and state courts may analyze the alleged deficiency 
exclusively in terms of state law.  Even those Courts of Appeals 
that have deemed exhausted claims that were raised sua sponte 
by the state court have done so only where the state court 
explicitly identified the claim as a federal claim and analyzed 
it under federal law.  See, e.g., Jones v. Dretke, 375 F.3d 352, 
355 (5th Cir. 2004); Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376-
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v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); McCandless v. 
Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999).   
Because the due process claim was properly exhausted, 
we move on to review the merits of the Superior Court’s 
decision.  Here, again, the tension between Francis and 
Middleton is dispositive, because, as we discussed in 
connection with Mathias’s ineffective assistance claim, the 
relevant Supreme Court case law on ambiguous jury 
instructions—specifically, whether a curative instruction is 
required when inconsistent instructions are given—was not 
then-clearly established.  Richter, 562 U.S. at 101.  
Accordingly, the Superior Court’s rejection of Mathias’s due 
process claim was neither “contrary to, [n]or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”  
28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). 
Moreover, any error would be harmless because there 
was no “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
                                              
77 (9th Cir. 2002); Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1356 
(8th Cir. 1990); Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 
1206 (11th Cir. 1984).  We have not adopted that rule to date, 
see Sharrieff v. Cathel, 574 F.3d 225, 228 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(noting in dictum that the Supreme Court has “recognized 
exceptions” to the fair presentation requirement “where the 
State has actually passed upon the claim” (quoting Castille v. 
Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989))), and we do not have 
occasion to consider it further today because here, Mathias 
himself fairly presented the federal claim.  We hold only that 
where, as here, a pro se petitioner has expressly identified the 
claim that counsel allegedly failed to raise as a federal 
constitutional claim and has briefed the merits of that claim by 
citing to federal cases, the claim has been properly exhausted. 
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determining the jury’s verdict.”  Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
U.S. 619, 623 (1993).  Just as we held in Bronshtein v. Horn, 
404 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2005), that the error was harmless where 
the first-degree murder instruction likewise erroneously 
omitted specific intent but the trial court’s instructions 
regarding conspiracy and the jury’s guilty verdict on that 
charge evinced a finding of specific intent to kill, id. at 711-15, 
so too here the error was harmless because the jury was 
instructed that the alleged co-conspirators must have “shared 
the intent to commit the crime of first degree murder,” which 
“would include the defendant having . . . shared the specific 
intent to kill,”  App. 630, and the jury proceeded to return a 
guilty verdict on that charge.  Nor is our conclusion altered by 
the fact that the trial court gave a progression charge or that the 
conspiracy charge also referred back to the first-degree murder 
instruction because the jury received its instructions in toto 
before beginning deliberations, and we presume the jury 
followed those instructions, including as to the specific intent 
it was required to find to convict Mathias as a co-conspirator.  
See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000).   
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order granting Mathias a writ of habeas corpus and 
deny Mathias’s application for a certificate of appealability.   
